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INTRODUCTION
Andrew Coan’s book, Rationing the Constitution, 1 offers a novel
account of the forces that drive Supreme Court decisions across a wide
array of highly controversial, vitally important areas of law. The project is
ambitious. It endeavors to improve our understanding of forces that
constrain the form and, ultimately, the substance of our constitutional law
along each of its major axes: federalism, the separation of powers, and
individual rights. I think it succeeds. The book’s central claim—that
familiar (but underexplored) institutional constraints and background
norms sharply limit the range of choices available to the Court when it is
called upon to enforce the Constitution—is almost certainly correct.
I am less confident, however, about the extent to which the precise
contours of legal doctrine—at least in connection with federalism
jurisprudence (and probably more broadly)—can be explained by
reference to Coan’s judicial capacity model, as opposed to other forces. 2
In that vein, this essay explores a hypothesis about the Court’s post-1937
federalism jurisprudence that might explain the arc of the doctrine at least
as well as the judicial capacity model does, and that I think deserves more
attention than Rationing the Constitution provides. The hypothesis is that,
during the relevant period, there has never been a critical mass of Justices
on the Supreme Court with a genuine appetite for seriously constraining
federal power. And this is not because the Justices worry about the Court’s
capacity to process the volume of cases that would arise if they established
*
Robert A. Sullivan Professor of Law, University of Michigan Law School.
Many thanks to the editors of the Wisconsin Law Review for inviting me to participate in
this Symposium and, of course, to Andy Coan, for giving us all so much to think about.
1.
ANDREW COAN, RATIONING THE CONSTITUTION: HOW JUDICIAL CAPACITY
SHAPES SUPREME COURT DECISION-MAKING (2019).
2.
Coan appears to be less confident about this as well. See id. at 47–50
(discussing the phenomenon of observational equivalence, noting that other models of
judicial decision-making might, across certain bodies of case law, yield the same
predictions as the judicial capacity model, and acknowledging that it is difficult to
determine how much explanatory power to assign to the forces on which each model
focuses).
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such constraints, but because doing so is unattractive in its own right. I am
aware, of course, that many conservative jurists and commentators have
vigorously lamented the explosion of federal power during and since the
New Deal. Still, for a variety of reasons that I will explore in this essay, I
am inclined to think this is more of a political talking point than the
foundation for a genuine, actionable agenda for doctrinal change. 3
In Part I, I briefly summarize the key features of Coan’s judicial
capacity model and describe its application to cases involving the scope of
federal power. In Part II, I make the case that these cases are best
understood by reference to considerations external to the judicial capacity
model. These include conservative Justices’ recognition of, and
resignation to, the fact that the size of the national government and the
scale of its regulatory activity are (to a significant extent) both necessary
and non-negotiable. I will also argue that the contours of the doctrine are,
in part, an outgrowth of the Justices’ commitment to the rule of law (or, at
least, squeamishness about being called out for failing to adhere to it).
I. THE JUDICIAL CAPACITY MODEL
The central thesis of Rationing the Constitution is that, in certain
“high-stakes” and/or “high-volume” areas of constitutional law,
constraints on the capacity of the federal judiciary (the Supreme Court of
the United States in particular) will cause the Justices to embrace clear
categorical rules and to defer to the constitutional judgments of other
government actors. 4 They do so, Coan explains, because they effectively
have no choice. Reliance on vague standards or on a non-deferential
approach, the argument goes, would trigger a dramatic increase in the
number of lawsuits challenging federal legislation and would cause a
related spike in the number of lower federal court decisions invalidating
federal statutes and regulations. 5 To avoid being confronted with a docket
far beyond the Justices’ capacity to process, the Court would then need to
relax either its commitment to foundational norms of judicial
professionalism or its commitments to preserving the uniformity of federal
law and reviewing virtually every lower court decision that invalidates a
federal enactment. 6 None of these options (i.e. drowning in cases, deciding
cases in irresponsible haste, or tolerating disuniformity and the widespread
invalidation of federal law by lower courts) is remotely tolerable to the
Justices; and so, Coan argues, across many important areas of

3.
It is possible that, with the appointments of Justices Gorsuch and
Kavanaugh, this is no longer true. Time will tell.
4.
COAN, supra note 1, at 31.
5.
Id. at 19.
6.
Id. at 23–24.

2020:155

Eighty Years of Federalism Forbearance

157

constitutional law, we see the Court rely on categorical rules and exhibit
high levels of deference to the political branches of government. 7
The relationship between judicial deference and reliance on rules, on
the one hand, and the frequency of challenges to federal law, on the other,
is fairly straightforward. As Coan points out, the incentive for parties who
feel burdened by federal law or regulation to initiate a legal challenge is
weaker if courts establish a pattern of strong deference to the political
branches: the more likely courts are to defer (and thus uphold federal law),
the less likely parties are to raise challenges, because the expected
outcome of the litigation is less likely to be favorable. 8 Reliance on vague
standards in suits challenging federal law, meanwhile, increases
uncertainty with respect to outcomes; and uncertainty will, likewise, tend
to drive parties into court, since adversaries are more likely to
simultaneously see a path to victory when the legal landscape is hazy. 9
Where the stakes are high enough and the doctrinal framework is
applicable to a large number of statutes and circumstances, then, reliance
on standards and a non-deferential approach will trigger the docket
pressures mentioned above. 10
Coan argues that, at least since the New Deal, the key Supreme Court
decisions relating to the scope of federal power under the Commerce and
Spending Clauses closely follow this pattern. Thus, he points out that,
from 1937 to 1995, the Justices adhered to a rigid rule of deference to
congressional judgments relating to the scope of federal power to regulate
interstate commerce. 11 And although the Court has, since 1995, exhibited
some willingness to police the outer limits of this power, it has done so by
way of rigid, categorical distinctions between what is subject to federal
regulation (economic activity) and what is not (non-economic activity,
inactivity). 12 Those limits, meanwhile, are exceedingly narrow in scope,
so it remains fair to say that the longstanding tradition of deference
continues to hold sway in connection with the commerce power. 13 The
Supreme Court’s Spending Clause jurisprudence from 1936 until the
present day has a roughly similar shape, with something “approaching a
rule of categorical deference” 14 at its core. That pattern of deference has
been interrupted only by the Court’s 2012 decision in National Federation
7.
Id. at 23.
8.
Id.
9.
Id. at 21–22.
10.
Coan also emphasizes that, in many of these scenarios, at least some of the
parties with strong incentives to challenge federal law will possess the resources necessary
to mount such challenges and pursue them with vigor. See, e.g., id. at 71–72, 84.
11.
Id. at 62–63.
12.
Id.; see Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519 (2012); United
States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
13.
COAN, supra note 1, at 63–64.
14.
Id. at 84.
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of Independent Business v. Sebelius, 15 which, on Coan’s telling, is highly
unlikely to support the invalidation of other exercises of the spending
power. 16 This suffices to show, at the very least, that the pattern of
Supreme Court decisions in these areas is consistent with the expectations
generated by the judicial capacity model.
As Coan acknowledges, however, it’s one thing to say that the key
cases in these areas are consistent with his model, and another to say that
that model provides the best explanation as to why the case law has
assumed its current form. 17 In the Section that follows, I explore an
alternative explanation (really, it’s a series of interlocking explanations)
for the phenomena Coan observes in the Supreme Court’s federalism
decisions.
II. THE PATTERN OF DECISIONS: AN ALTERNATIVE EXPLANATION
As a general matter, we should expect Supreme Court Justices to
eschew approaches toward constitutional interpretation that threaten
serious upheaval with respect to important, deeply-entrenched governance
practices—and this is true whether those practices relate to federal-state
relations, the separation of powers, or individual rights. There are two
principal reasons for this. One, which Rationing the Constitution mentions
repeatedly, is fear of the political backlash that is likely to accompany
decisions that upset settled expectations with respect to matters of great
importance. 18 The other, which Coan gestures at only briefly, is that even
Justices who are deeply troubled by the prospect of a federal government
with something approaching a general police power understand (and are
resigned to the fact) that, along many different dimensions, responsible
stewardship of American economic life requires a heavy federal hand. 19
I’m reminded here of a quip Justice Scalia was known to trot out when
describing his approach toward constitutional interpretation (and
distinguishing that approach from the one favored by Justice Thomas): “I
am an originalist,” he liked to say, “but I am not a nut.” 20 Interpretive
15.
567 U.S. 519 (2012).
16.
Id. at 80–81 (describing what he believes are the limits on the reach of the
standard articulated in NFIB and concluding “[i]f this is the case, it is difficult to imagine
any federal spending legislation besides the Affordable Care Act that would be
unconstitutional under [the] controlling approach”).
17.
Id. at 40.
18.
See, e.g., id. at 44, 67, 83.
19.
See id. at 75 (acknowledging that certain “extreme results” might “give
pause to many justices”); id. at 74 (noting that revival of the manufacturing/commerce
distinction in Commerce Clause cases “would produce results that many Justices would
find unpalatable”).
20.
JEFFREY TOOBIN, THE NINE: INSIDE THE SECRET WORLD OF THE SUPREME
COURT 103 (2007).
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methods or doctrinal formulas that threaten to, say, undermine the legal
foundation for the modern administrative state or disable the national
government from regulating in spaces it has dominated for decades, seem
to me to fall squarely on the “nut” side of the line. And whatever individual
Justices (or conservative legal commentators) might say about how
dreadfully out of balance our federalism has become, we should not expect
their discomfort to yield doctrinal outcomes that threaten to dislodge wellestablished, highly consequential patterns of governance. 21
This has significant implications for the Supreme Court’s treatment
of both the Commerce and Spending Clauses. The former, as Coan
explains, supplies the textual hook for “the vast majority of federal
criminal laws, as well as the vast majority of federal regulation on subjects
ranging from environmental protection to food and drug safety to
consumer protection to antitrust to banking and securities to national
energy markets to aviation safety.” 22 The latter, meanwhile, “underwrites
an enormous quantity of legislation” including more than 800 federal
programs distributing funds to the states in amounts exceeding half a
trillion dollars a year. 23
To be sure, it is not the case that each and every one of these laws and
federal programs is sacrosanct, such that striking down one or more of
them would necessarily qualify as nutty. But the imperative to eschew
legal doctrine that casts doubt on the constitutionality of the true sacred
cows among these statutes (and we can quibble over which, exactly, those
are) is powerful and, I suspect, sufficient to explain the basic structure of
modern federalism doctrine. So far as deference is concerned, Coan points
out that abandonment of the deferential approach that characterizes
modern Commerce Clause jurisprudence in favor of stringent limits like
those that held sway during the early part of the 20th century would
“probably require invalidation of large sections of the Controlled
Substances Act, the Clean Air and Water Acts, federal antitrust law,
federal labor law, federal employment discrimination law, and so on.” 24
Similarly, if the Court were to rely on vague standards instead of
categorical rules to police the limits of federal power under either the
Commerce Clause or the Spending Clause, it would “call into question a
21.
Again, it is possible that the confirmation of the two Trump nominees to the
Supreme Court changes this calculus. Cf., e.g., Gundy v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 2116,
2130–31 (2019) (Alito, J., concurring) (expressing openness to reconsidering the
nondelegation doctrine); id. at 2148 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting) (reconsidering the contours
of the nondelegation doctrine).
22.
COAN, supra note 1, at 71; see also id. (noting that “[e]ach of these laws, in
turn, contains innumerable discrete regulations of individual behavior that might be subject
to constitutional challenge, depending on the Supreme Court’s interpretation of the
commerce power”).
23.
Id. at 83.
24.
Id. at 74–75.
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vast quantity of federal legislation” 25 touching on subjects ranging from
education to public health to social security.
Rationing the Constitution sounds similar themes in connection with
the separation of powers and individual rights. Coan observes, for
example, that if the Court were to abandon its longstanding tradition of
deferring to Congress when it comes to delegating power to administrative
agencies, “it would call into question the entire regulatory state and its
attendant laws and regulations.” 26 Similarly, he notes, “[a] robust reading
of the Equal Protection Clause, articulated in the form of a vague standard
. . . would call into question much of the U.S. Code.” 27
At every turn, however, Coan pivots from these observations to the
claim that the introduction of such threats to the established regulatory
order is unattractive, not so much in its own right, but because it threatens
to spawn caseload pressures that the Court simply cannot bear. 28 But as I
read these segments of the book, I found myself casting about for the
jurisprudential equivalent of “you had me at hello.” Perhaps it’s: “you had
me at full-blown regulatory Armageddon.” Once it becomes clear that a
doctrinal framework raises doubts as to the constitutionality of significant
swaths of federal law or deeply entrenched federal programs, one need not
cast about for explanations as to why the Justices have consistently
avoided that framework. To the contrary, this is just what you’d expect if
you endorsed the (I think uncontroversial) premise that the Justices will
not craft doctrine that threatens to shake the foundations of modern
governance.
Indeed, to insist that the judicial capacity model is needed to solve
the “doctrinal puzzles” Coan identifies is to imagine a cadre of Justices
with a rather odd mix of risk aversion and recklessness. They’re willing to
25.
Id. at 73–74; see also id. at 85 (explaining that reliance on vague standards
to mark the limits of the spending power would “call into question a large and uncertain
fraction of spending-power legislation”).
26.
Id. at 96; see also id. at 97 (arguing that reliance on a vague standard to
enforce the nondelegation principle would “cast a pall of uncertainty over all congressional
delegations” and “threaten a large fraction of federal statutes”); id. at 107–08 (“Rigorous
enforcement of the unitary executive theory would imperil the existence of independent
agencies and would call into question every mechanism of congressional oversight, formal
and informal, including the Administrative Procedure Act.”); id. at 110 (noting that
reviving a categorical prohibition on Congress limiting the president’s power to remove
high-level executive officials would mean “dismantl[ing] independent agencies, including
the Federal Reserve”).
27.
Id. at 130; see also id. at 26 (“A robust reading of either the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment or the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment,
articulated in the form of a vague standard, would call into question a very large fraction
of the U.S. Code. . . . This includes environmental, labor, workplace safety, consumer
protection, securities, banking, and myriad other regulations at the federal level and similar
regulations at the state and local levels, along with land use, zoning, licensing, and traffic
regulations of every description . . . .”).
28.
Id. at 74, 85, 96, 108, 131.
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consider doctrinal changes that might seriously destabilize longstanding
and foundational regulatory practices, but they balk at the prospect of an
overloaded Supreme Court docket or a diminished commitment to
uniformity in the interpretation of federal law. I have difficulty making
sense of that preference ordering.
Of course, one would think that there are options available to the
Court that lie somewhere in between unrelenting, abject deference and
full-blown regulatory Armageddon. For example, the Court might rely on
categorical distinctions that do not raise questions about the
constitutionality of the modern administrative state; or it might rely on
flexible standards to carve out disfavored regulatory efforts without
meaningfully undermining the tradition of federal empowerment we
associate with New Deal constitutionalism. As Coan puts it, we might
expect the Justices either to “impose meaningful across-the-board limits
that would curb, but not overturn, the modern regulatory state” 29 or to
“opportunistically invalidat[e] commerce-power legislation that they
oppose on ideological grounds.” 30
But this turns out to be much easier said than done. To begin with,
it’s fair to ask what these “meaningful across-the-board limits”—limits
that would “curb, but not overturn, the modern regulatory state”—might
be. Rationing the Constitution does not say. The limits deployed by the
Court in the late-nineteenth and early-twentieth centuries—in particular,
the distinctions between manufacturing and commerce, 31 and between
direct and indirect effects on interstate commerce 32—surely do not qualify.
By the 1930s and 40s, these devices were understood to serve as
significant obstacles to responsible federal supervision of the national
economy. Relying on them now, or on similar doctrinal tools, could only
be more disruptive and destructive.
Moreover, neither the more recent case law in this area nor the
attendant scholarly commentary offers many suggestions for alternative
limits that would qualify as both meaningful and not untenably disruptive.
Instead, both sets of sources are long on handwringing about the expansion
of federal power and short on plausible ideas as to how the Court might
29.
Id. at 67; see also id. at 83 (arguing that fear of political backlash cannot
explain “why the Court’s conservatives have never been seriously tempted to impose more
modest but still meaningful across-the-board limits” on the spending power).
30.
Id. at 67; see also id. at 83 (arguing that fear of political backlash “does not
explain why the Court’s liberals and conservatives have both refrained from
opportunistically invalidating the occasional spending-power statute”).
31.
E.g., United States v. E.C. Knight Co., 156 U.S. 1, 12 (1895) (“Commerce
succeeds to manufacture, and not a part of it.”).
32.
E.g., A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 546
(1935) (“In determining how far the federal government may go in controlling intrastate
transactions upon the ground that they ‘affect’ interstate commerce, there is a necessary
and well-established distinction between direct and indirect effects.”).
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rein it in. For example, Justice Thomas’s concurring opinion in United
States v. Lopez 33 contemplates meaningful limits on federal power, 34 as do
articles by Richard Epstein and Randy Barnett. 35 But the vision laid out in
these sources (and there’s a good deal of substantive overlap among them)
would, as Epstein acknowledges, “require dismantling . . . large portions
of the modern federal government.” 36 The majority opinion in Lopez,
meanwhile, along with cases like United States v. Morrison 37 and NFIB v.
Sebelius, have the opposite character: they do not threaten the foundations
of modern national governance, but the limits they announce are, as Coan
explains, rather narrow in scope. 38
The Court’s failure to experiment with potential middle-ground
categorical limits or with vague standards is best explained, I think, by
reference to two considerations. First, even if we presume that
ideologically conservative jurists would be pleased to scale back the
modern regulatory state in meaningful ways (but ways that do not threaten
to dismantle the whole thing), it’s hard to do so by way of categorical rules
without threatening at least some legislation that political conservatives
would likely wish to preserve. Consider, for example, the Controlled
Substances Act or the many federal statutes that preempt state tort law.
Judges could, I suppose, attempt to gerrymander the relevant categories in
order to avoid goring their own ox, but this will run headlong into a second
consideration—the rule of law.
As Larry Lessig explained in his widely-cited article, Translating
Federalism, the Court faces “constant pressure . . . to avoid rules that, in
context, in their application, appear political.” 39 Indeed, Lessig attributes
the collapse of pre-New Deal Commerce Clause jurisprudence to precisely
this concern. The formalisms the Court had been relying on at that time
33.
514 U.S. 549 (1995).
34.
Id. at 584–85 (Thomas, J., concurring) (advocating reconsideration of the
“substantial effects” test and raising doubts about the soundness of the aggregation
principle announced in Wickard v. Filburn).
35.
See Randy E. Barnett, The Original Meaning of the Commerce Clause, 68
U. CHI. L. REV. 101, 101 (2001) (arguing that Congress’s power to regulate interstate
commerce is the power “to specify rules to govern the manner by which people may
exchange or trade goods from one state to another, [and] to remove obstructions to
domestic trade erected by states”); Richard A. Epstein, The Proper Scope of the Commerce
Power, 73 U. VA. L. REV. 1387, 1454 (1987) (arguing that “[t]he affirmative scope of the
commerce power should be limited to . . . interstate transportation, navigation and sales,
and the activities closely incident to them”).
36.
Epstein, supra note 35, at 1454–55.
37.
529 U.S. 598 (2000).
38.
COAN, supra note 1, at 63–65.
39.
Lawrence Lessig, Translating Federalism: United States v. Lopez, 1995
SUP. CT. REV. 125, 175. Lessig labels this the “Frankfurter constraint” because Felix
Frankfurter expounded upon the idea in an article exploring the history of Commerce
Clause jurisprudence. See id. at 174 n.142 (citing FELIX FRANKFURTER, THE COMMERCE
CLAUSE: UNDER MARSHALL, TANEY AND WAITE 54 (1937)).
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had, as Lessig explains, “been rendered political.” 40 They “seemed more
the result of extra-judicial judgments than entailed by the legal material,” 41
and so the Court had to abandon them. If this is right—if the Court is
meaningfully constrained by the need to avoid the appearance of rendering
nakedly political judgments (and I think it is)—then the Justices’
consistent failure to “opportunistically” invalidate exercises of the
commerce and spending powers—whether by way of categorical rules or
vague standards—is entirely predictable. It’s what we would expect if we
presume that judges are committed to preserving the rule of law or, at least,
to keeping up appearances about it.
CONCLUSION
I am confident that Coan had each of these concerns in view as he
worked on Rationing the Constitution. Snippets of them (sometimes more
than just snippets) appear in the text, especially where Coan acknowledges
and explores the attitudinal and strategic models of judicial decisionmaking. My disagreement with Coan is, I think, more a matter of the
weight we assign to the different forces that drive such decision-making
than an outgrowth of our having different intuitions about what those
forces are. If there’s something provocative or perhaps controversial about
my view, it’s the notion that while the reach of federal power under
prevailing doctrine sticks in the craw of many conservative jurists and
commentators, most know it’s something that cannot be undone, and most
wouldn’t want to anyway. If that’s right, then what we see in the case law
is not an exercise in rationing the Constitution, but in preserving its
relevance.

40.
41.

Id. at 177.
Id.

